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Economic Growth and Inequality: The New Post-Washington Consensus
*
 
 
The debate on economic policy has developed significantly in the past decade. The so-called 
Washington Consensus, which dictated most of the solutions proposed by international 
financial organizations, began to be questioned when a large number of emerging economies 
reduced their reliance on multilateral debt. The crisis of 2008 and 2009 accelerated the 
process of reflection on the prescriptive nature of the policy proposals advocated by 
monetarists, with their insistence on a uniform view as if all situations were alike. This has 
been termed ideology, and the ideology associated with the Washington Consensus has failed 
even in its methodological principles, as clearly demonstrated by the internal debate within 
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. This article 
reviews the various internal arguments of the international financial organizations, and 
provides a critique of preconstructed models involving a return to Keynesian economics. It 
ends with an optimistic view of the broadening and democratization of the debate on 
economic policies, termed the new post-Washington Consensus.  
Keywords: Washington Consensus; financial crisis; economic development; financial system; 
globalization. 
 
 
 The pƌefiǆ ͞post͟ has Ŷoǁ ďeĐoŵe a ĐoŵŵoŶ ĐuƌƌeŶĐǇ spƌeadiŶg fƌoŵ philosophǇ to the 
political scene of globalization. It signals the overthrow of West-originated certainties that 
have long been used to explain and govern the world.  
With the devastating crisis that hit most of the wealthy countries1 and the failure of the 
financial systems, we entered a new era, characterized by both conjunctural and structural 
changes. It entails a profound transformation that affects the perception and the 
distribution of power. Could this mean the end of the so-called Washington Consensus?  
 
What is the Washington Consensus? 
The teƌŵ ͞WashiŶgtoŶ CoŶseŶsus͟ comes from a simple set of ten recommendations 
identified by economist John Williamson in 1989: 1) fiscal discipline; 2) redirecting public 
expenditure; 3) tax reform; 4) financial liberalization; 5) adoption of a single, competitive 
                                                        
* Article published in RCCS 94 (September 2011). Thanks are due to Elena Proden and Adriana Jacinto for their 
help in preparing this text.  
A different version of this article was published in English in Géopolitique Africaine, ϰϯ ;ϮϬϭϮͿ, ǁith the title ͞Is 
There a post-WashiŶgtoŶ CoŶseŶsus?͟ 
1
 In this text, the term wealthy countries refers essentially to G7 members and the European Union. Other 
methods of measuring economic wealth would undoubtedly produce a different list, but in common speech 
the term is still associated with the abovementioned group of countries.  
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exchange rate; 6) trade liberalization; 7) elimination of barriers to foreign direct 
investment; 8) privatization of state owned enterprises; 9) deregulation of market entry 
and competition; and ϭϬͿ seĐuƌe pƌopeƌtǇ ƌights. The ƌefeƌeŶĐe to ͞ĐoŶseŶsus͟ ŵeaŶt that 
this list was premised on the ideas shared at the time by power circles in Washington, 
including the US Congress and Administration, on the one hand, and international 
institutions such as the Washington-based IMF and the World Bank, on the other, 
supported by a range of think tanks and influential economists.  
It is important to note here that the theoretical foundations underlying these policy 
recommendations were nothing else but neoclassical economics espousing a firm belief in 
the ŵaƌket͛s ͞iŶǀisiďle haŶd,͟ the ratioŶalitǇ of eĐoŶoŵiĐ aĐtoƌs͛ ĐhoiĐe, aŶd a minimalistic 
ǀisioŶ of the states͛ ƌegulatioŶ of eĐoŶoŵies. The adǀeŶt of this Ŷeǁ paƌadigŵ has also 
marked the retreat of development economics as a distinct field, which had been long 
doŵiŶated ďǇ the ͞DepeŶdeŶĐǇ “Đhool͟ aŶd otheƌ theoƌies ;Naiŵ, ϭϵϵϵͿ, ofteŶ iŶ shaƌp 
contrast with neoclassical economics and methodological individualism. It was 
development economics that had often guided policies experimented with in developing 
countries before the Washington Consensus era. Most independent African governments, 
for example, sought to promote industrialization, in an effort to develop local production 
and reduce imports, promote employment, raise the standard of living, and break out of 
the vicious circle of trade patterns epitomized in the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis 
(unfavorable terms of trade for commodity-exporting and manufacturer-importing 
ĐouŶtƌiesͿ. The WashiŶgtoŶ CoŶseŶsus͛ ƌeĐipes, ďǇ ĐoŶtƌast, ǁeƌe pƌeseŶted as uŶiǀeƌsal, 
similarly applicable in the context of developed and developing countries, even if they 
ended up being implemented in a discriminatory and uneven fashion.  
Washington Consensus policies were applied for more than two decades in such diverse 
contexts as Africa, Latin America and Asia, as well as in countries emerging from real 
socialism in Eastern Europe and Central Asia. There were usually two major stages of 
intervention: the first focused on macroeconomic stability and structural adjustment 
programs, and the second included such objectives as improving institutions, reducing 
corruption or dealing with infrastructure inefficiency (Naim, 1999). The conditionality 
exercised by the Bretton Woods institutions and wealthy countries played a crucial role in 
iŶdeďted ĐouŶtƌies͛ deĐisions to push through macroeconomic stabilization reforms and 
structural adjustment programs. The debt crisis that first affected a number of Latin 
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American countries and then African and Asian countries, in the 1970s and 1980s, further 
increased their dependence on external loans, leaving them no other option than to follow 
the prescriptions that enabled them to access financing.  
 
What Exactly Went Wrong?  
Washington Consensus policies have been criticized since the 1990s by a significant 
number of leading economists. Most notably, Joseph Stiglitz, chief economist at the World 
Bank from 1997 to 2000, criticized the policies prescribed by the IMF in response to the 
financial crises in Russia and Asia (Stiglitz, 2003); Paul Krugman was in favor of Asian 
governments imposing controls on capital flows in 1997-98. The debate generated over 
the response to the crisis provided a good illustration of the deep divide between leading 
economists, who either supported or opposed the IMF. The Washington Consensus purists 
insisted on the importance of stabilizing exchange rates in times of crisis through public 
budget cuts, higher taxes and interest rates and other recessive measures. Their 
opponents criticized such policies, arguing that they would lead to recession (Naim, 1999). 
Stiglitz called attention to the fact that sharp increases in interest rates would contribute 
towards the deepening of the crisis (Stiglitz, 2003).  
It is now commonplace to say that structural adjustment (SAP) and macroeconomic 
stabilization programs had a disastrous impact on social policies and poverty levels in 
many countries. Following the first wave of reforms undertaken by debt-affected African 
and Latin American countries – which included public expenditure cuts, introduction of 
charges for health and education, and reductions in industrial protection, leading to high 
unemployment, poverty rise and unequal income distribution – UNICEF published the 
report Adjustment with a Human Face (1987), which called for ͞ŵeso-poliĐies͟ to be 
redirected towards protecting social and economic sectors that were essential to the 
survival of the poor, through the introduction of social protection programs.  
The period of structural adjustment programs in sub-Saharan Africa in the 1980s was 
characterized by poor economic performance. The GDP rose by less than 1% in Africa 
between 1979 and 1992, whereas East Asia and the Pacific, where the state played an 
active role in promoting industrial and social policies as well as in poverty alleviation, 
registered an average growth of 5% between 1986 and 1992. African investments 
declined, aŶd the ĐoŶtiŶeŶt͛s shaƌe iŶ ǁoƌld eǆpoƌts also fell by more than one-half 
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between 1975 and 1990. The share of Africa in agricultural and food exports dropped from 
21 to 8.1% of deǀelopiŶg ĐouŶtƌies͛ eǆpoƌts, and in manufactured goods exports from 
7.8% in 1980 to 1.1% in 1990. Some critics pointed out that liberalization policies, and such 
policies as the elimination of subsidies for fertilizers, had a negative impact on agricultural 
productivity and output. Price reform promoted export crops over traditional food crops. 
Others argued that export crops contributed to indebtedness, or that adjustment 
programs exacerbated unequal land distribution, promising that ͞effiĐieŶt͟ laŶd ŵaƌkets 
would replace traditional tenure systems, while encouraging deindustrialization through 
͞wholesale privatization and unfettered markets͟ (Sahn, Dorosh & Younger, 1997: 1-6).  
One of the major drawbacks of the policies imposed by the IMF and the World Bank 
was the lack of technical expertise and strategic capability on the part of the implementing 
countries. A structurally unequal donor–recipient relationship was established, in part due 
to the weakening of the public sector induced by the drastic reduction of the 
administrative machine. The fast and uncontrolled liberalization of small African 
economies presented additional dangers, such as the high volatility of capital flows, but  
a larger problem for African economies is that their growth potential is directly affected by 
their ability to export and use export revenue to diversify production. Their ability to do so is 
constrained by a global trade regime inimical to the full developŵeŶt of AfƌiĐaŶ ĐouŶtƌies͛ 
comparative advantage. Limited market access for low-cost textiles, cotton, and agricultural 
products and competition from heavily subsidized industrial economy exports effectively 
prevent growth. (Manuel, 2003: 18) 
 
The social impact of these reforms was devastating for Sub-Saharan Africa. Many 
economists recognized that the difficulties associated with the promotion of economic 
stability and liberalization had a disproportionate impact on the poor, leading to greater 
poverty and unequal income distribution. International financial institutions, particularly 
the World Bank, displayed great intellectual arrogance in failing to acknowledge for a long 
time the vastly negative impact of such policies, denying the criticisms leveled at them, 
and limiting their response to launching compensatory programs (Sahn, Dorosh & 
Younger, 1997: 6). 
It is thus not surprising that macroeconomic stabilization and structural adjustment 
policies prompted a wave of popular unrest that contributed to the recrudescence of 
many civil wars in the 1990s. The 1997 Asian crisis also raised some important questions 
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about the consequences of the deregulation of financial markets and demonstrated the 
limits of Washington-based policy thought.  
 
The Structural Consequences of the Washington Consensus 
The rapid economic growth registered in many regions of the South in the first decade of 
the 21st century, accompanied by expanding trade and investment, offset the worries of 
the financial markets, which ignored the signs of the impending storm. In 2008, however, 
the crème de la crème of the economist profession, as well as the governments of rich 
countries, finally had to face the inconvenient truth about the imperfection of markets. 
Massive and uncontrolled financial speculation has produced the worst global economic 
crisis since the Great Depression, suddeŶlǇ ƌeǀealiŶg a Ŷuŵďeƌ of stƌuĐtuƌal ͞diseases͟ 
that the Washington Consensus had been hiding under the rug.  
The global downturn was revealing in two major respects. First, the domination of the 
financial sector over the real economy had led to the creation of bubbles, to 
unpredictability for the future of economies, and increased vulnerability of populations, 
simultaneously increasing unequal income distribution and the gap between rich and 
poor. Second, it called into question the prevailing economic theories that served as a 
basis for formulating and prescribing policies, including those formulated by Bretton-
Woods institutions at global level, in particular structural adjustment programs.  
In reality, after three decades of Washington Consensus, we have been witnessing a 
confluence of crises including spikes in food and energy prices as well as financial and 
economic downturn, further aggravated by the impact of global climate change and growing 
demography. A recent article that I co-authored with Ignacy Sachs and Ladislau Dowbor 
stresses the striking convergence of critical tendencies, ͞the sǇŶeƌgǇ of behaviors that [...] 
aƌe destƌoǇiŶg ouƌ fƌagile spaĐeship,͟ ƌefeƌƌiŶg to the iŶteƌdepeŶdeŶĐe of tƌeŶds iŶ aƌeas 
traditionally considered separately, such as demography, climate, industrial and agricultural 
production and consumption, pollution, etc. (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010: 1, 3). 
There is now more awareness of growing inequalities and the scandalous concentration 
of income – with the richest 20% getting 82.7% of the global income (Lopes, Sachs & 
Dowbor, 2010: 5). The dramatic rise in the share of poor people living in so-called 
emerging countries reveals how unequal income distribution is becoming, even in rapidly 
growing economies: 72% of the poor worldwide currently live in middle income countries, 
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whereas two decades ago 93% lived in low income countries (Sumner, 2011). In the 
current structure of power, economic growth, even when generated by technological 
innovation, benefits the financial intermediaries that pursue short-term maximization of 
profits rather than the engineers of the process (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010: 5). 
Productive inclusion as reflected in the formal sector is the exception rather than the 
rule. Production and consumption patterns reveal an abnormal deformation of priorities, 
where military budgets and luxury consumer goods dominate over access to basic services, 
education and health:  
The planet produces almost a kilo of grain per day per inhabitant and we have more than 
one billion people going hungry. The ten million children who die of hunger, no access to 
clean water and other absurd causes constitutes an unbearable scandal. But from the 
private investment point of view, solving essential problems generates no profits, and the 
orientation of our production capacity is radically deformed. (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010: 
7) 
These systemic failures are principally due to a skewed configuration of production 
processes, false structures of incentives, and an economic framework that externalizes 
soĐial aŶd eŶǀiƌoŶŵeŶtal Đosts, ƌelǇiŶg eǆĐlusiǀelǇ oŶ the ͞ƌatioŶal ĐhoiĐe͟ of aĐtoƌs aŶd 
the ͞Ŷatuƌal͟ ďalance of the market – to say nothing of the way the global economy is 
currently run. The power imbalance within the global structures of financial and economic 
governance, namely the IMF and the World Bank, is evident on three levels:   First, the prevailing ideology, entirely dominated by monetarist thought, imposed on 
the countries of the South and transition economies for more than 20 years, despite 
blatant failures and disastrous social impact;   Second, the power structure established by voting shares within the IMF and the 
World Bank, which still does not reflect the size of economies, not to mention the 
representation of the interests of the poorest;  Third, the strong belief that wealthy countries would never be affected by crises, 
something that justified discriminatory practices in terms of surveillance before 2008 
(IEO, 2011) and the application of double standards during the crisis. Thus, the 
financial crisis that resulted from spiraling deregulation did not come as a complete 
surprise.  
Concerning the last point, we need only compare the IMF response to the current 
European crisis with the policies it implemented in the 1980s and 1990s to have an idea of 
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those double standards. Although there has been a laudable change of attitude, favoring 
the soĐial diŵeŶsioŶ iŶstead of Đƌeditoƌs͛ iŶteƌests, the faĐt is that these poliĐies aƌe oŶlǇ 
being promoted now, in Europe, hypocritically erasing the past. What is there to say of 
facts such as these: the total African external debt was $324.7 billion USD in 2010, 
meaning 20.7% of GDP, while the public debt of the United States was $14.5 trillion USD in 
the same year, or 98.6% of GDP?  
 
How Did Science Become Ideology? 
The ostensible belief in recipes that doŶ͛t ǁoƌk aŶd yet continue to be used is somewhat 
of a paradox. When theoretical tools designed to help comprehend reality are used 
without regard to their limitations, or when findings are selectively adjusted to endorse 
one single view premised on wishful thinking, then science becomes ideology. 
Globalization as it emerged and was perceived over the last decade of the 20th century 
prompted a wave of opposition. The most radical and vocal opponents of the Washington 
Consensus accused Bretton Woods institutions and wealthy countries of spreading a new 
ideology – neoliberalism. Leading economists got blinded by the myth of perfect markets, 
either by choice or circumstance. As Paul Krugman saƌĐastiĐallǇ put it, ͞the eĐoŶoŵiĐs 
profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in 
impressive-looking mathematics, for truth͟ ;KƌugŵaŶ, ϮϬϬϵ: MM36). 
The neoclassical notion of market efficiency, challenged by John Maynard Keynes, who 
called for active government intervention in the marketplace by printing more money and 
increasing public spending to boost demand during the Great Depression, is now again the 
focus of attention. The truth is that the blind belief in markets has enjoyed great 
popularity in the last two decades. Led by Milton Friedman, monetarism invaded 
economic thought in the 1970s, seeking to reconcile macroeconomics with neoclassical 
microeconomic postulates in order to bring back to center stage the idea of market 
efficiency. Monetarists admitted only limited forms of government intervention, linked to 
a very modest regulation of money supply. Famously, Milton Friedman called for the 
dissolution of the IMF since it interfered with the workings of the free market. Many 
macroeconomists completely rejected Keynesian theory regarding economic crises, and 
otheƌs ͞returned to the view of Schumpeter and other apologists for the Great 
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DepƌessioŶ, ǀieǁiŶg ƌeĐessioŶs as a good thiŶg, paƌt of the eĐoŶoŵǇ͛s adjustŵeŶt to 
ĐhaŶge͟ (Krugman, 2009: 36MM). 
This debate had a strong influence on IMF postulates in particular. Without adopting 
monetarism wholesale, the major concepts of the Washington Consensus provided 
ƌespoŶses to the IMF͛s ĐoŶĐeƌŶs ǁith ŵiŶiŵiziŶg ƌegulatioŶ aŶd lettiŶg ŵaƌkets do theiƌ 
work. It was this approach that led the IMF to believe that its main job was to liberalize the 
market in the countries of the South, and later in so-called transition economies since 
these represented the major obstacle to an open economy.  
The ƌepoƌt ƌeĐeŶtlǇ pƌoduĐed ďǇ the IMF͛s IŶdepeŶdeŶt EǀaluatioŶ OffiĐe oŶ the failuƌe 
of the IMF͛s suƌǀeillaŶĐe role, vehemently criticized its performance on one of its main 
functions — warn member countries of the risks building up in the world economy, as well 
as in their national contexts. Among the major impediments identified by the Evaluation 
OffiĐe ǁeƌe ͞a high degƌee of groupthink, intellectual capture, a general mindset that a 
major financial crisis in large advanced economies was unlikely, and inadequate analytical 
approaches͟ ;IEO, 2011: 17).  
A Đaƌeful ƌeadiŶg of the ƌepoƌt͛s fiŶdiŶgs ƌeǀeals additioŶal inconvenient truths. First, 
intellectual narrow-mindedness creates situations where the line between what we see 
and what we want to see is too easy to cross. AŶotheƌ iŵpoƌtaŶt ƌeasoŶ foƌ the IMF͛s 
failure to report accurately and produce honest analysis was the influence of the largest 
shareholders on surveillance and policies (IEO, 2011: 20).  
The IEO dƌeǁ aŶ uŶflatteƌiŶg piĐtuƌe of the IMF staff, poiŶtiŶg to ͞ĐogŶitiǀe ďiases,͟ 
including a homogeneous mindset (groupthinkͿ aŶd aŶ ͞iŶsulaƌ Đultuƌe͟ that rarely 
referred to external research; the belief that economists in advanced countries were 
better aware of what was happening in their own countries, overlooking the importance 
of financial issues and the analysis of macroeconomic linkages; overreliance on models 
and similar tools, such as macro modeling, which practically did not include the analysis of 
money and asset markets; overreliance on simplistic and first-round examination 
techniques, such as stress testing, to determine the soundness of banking systems; and 
worst still, misinterpretation or dismissal of certain data for the sake of theoretical 
coherence (IEO, 2011: 17-19). 
Intellectual honesty was further injured by the lack of reference to the limitations of 
data or to the existence of different analyses. The IMF epitomized the major drawbacks of 
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modern knowledge production and applied research, characterized by sectoral approaches 
and lack of holistic analysis. More specifically, it opted for economic theories, quantitative 
and data selection methods that sustained the coherence of its neoclassical assumptions. 
Dissenting views were silenced given the power chain reaction between the largest 
shareholder countries and senior management. The authors of the evaluation report also 
noted the complaints about lack of even-handedness in the treatment of different 
countries (IEO, 2011: 20). To put it in a nutshell, the main institution in charge of 
macroeconomic policy recommendations produced an analysis that was heavily influenced 
by its most powerful members, and promoted conformity, self-censorship, data selectivity, 
and one set of analytical approaches implemented in a discriminatory manner. 
It is essential to engage in an honest academic dialogue and to promote intelligent 
systems of governance that are open to a plurality of approaches and lead to fruitful 
synergies between different contributions. Regrettably, however, there are too many 
cases of bias in the collection and interpretation of statistical data. We have a growing 
awareness of the multifaceted and diverse nature of our world, and of the interconnection 
between the various challenges that we face. This opens up new perspectives on how we 
can see and interpret the world around us, helping us to think outside the box. Besides the 
GDP, the Human Development Index (HDI), the Gini coefficient, and the Happiness Index 
represented important breakthroughs. The number of economic, social, and statistical 
indicators that can help us understand the importance of demography is growing at a fast 
pace. For instance, the way in which we currently measure international trade does not 
reflect the complexity of global production chains (Lamy, 2011).  
Bearing this in mind, Robert Zoellick, the president of the World Bank, sent an 
important signal ǁheŶ he iŶitiated the liďeƌalizatioŶ of the BaŶk͛s information policy, 
granting public access to about 7000 data sets that were previously available only to 
subscribers, mostly governments and researchers. During the first month alone, 4.5 million 
individual visitors accessed the site. Since these data are used to define social and 
economic policies, their importance as a bargaining tool is fundamental. The data and 
methodology underlying the analysis and political recommendations of the World Bank 
are thus open to public scrutiny. Robert Zoellick described his decision as a 
͞deŵoĐƌatizatioŶ of deǀelopŵeŶt eĐoŶoŵiĐs͟ (Strom, 2011). Maybe this is an 
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exaggeration, but the truth is that after the failure of the Washington Consensus in what 
concerns the transparency of its methods of analysis, any progress is welcome.  
 
Significant Changes in Africa and Its Role  
The sets of indicators we select for our analysis and the way we collect, define and 
interpret data are important. The divergence between the Washington-based institutions, 
on the one hand, and the United Nations, on the other, in the 1990s with regard to the 
impact of structural adjustment reforms provides a compelling example of different 
recommendations based on different approaches.  
The growing influence of the South, including African countries, is a factor that is going 
to contribute to change on many levels. At present, we cannot afford to ignore 
divergences, since the major players and power relations are rapidly changing dominant 
ideas. When Goldman Sachs coined the term BRIC (acronym for Brazil, Russia, India, China) 
in 2001, many did not take it seriously. The 2008-09 crisis accelerated the shift in the 
global balance of power, and the G20 took over the leading role from the G8. In 2010, 
BRICS, now including South Africa, already accounted for 25.6% of the ǁoƌld͛s GDP, ϭϱ.ϱ% 
of trade, and 42.6% of the ǁoƌld͛s populatioŶ ;2,940 million).  
In terms of economic relevance, African countries are still relatively marginal. However, 
the ĐoŶtiŶeŶt͛s average growth rate increased by 5 to 6% during the last decade, and the 
OECD reported that the rate of return on investment there has beeŶ the ǁoƌld͛s highest iŶ 
recent years. A new study by Ernst & Young indicates that foreign direct investment (FDI) in 
Africa grew 87% in the last decade, and that FDI flows continued even during the crisis and 
may even accelerate in 2012, reaching 150 billion USD by 2015 (Ernst & Young, 2011: 7). The 
Boston Consulting Group has recently arrived at a similar conclusion based on somewhat 
different data, namely an annual growth in exports of 18% since 2000, similar to BRICS, and 
an annual increase of over 8% in the revenues of the 500 largest African companies since 
1998. This report (produced before the Arab revolutions) points to the emergence of the so-
Đalled ͞AfƌiĐaŶ LioŶs͟ ;ďǇ aŶalogǇ to the ͞AsiaŶ Tigeƌs͟Ϳ, ǁhiĐh iŶĐlude Algeƌia, BotsǁaŶa, 
Egypt, Libya, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa and Tunisia (with a collective GDP per capita 
of 10,000 USD, exceeding that of BRICS), soon to be joined by Ghana and Nigeria (BCG, 2010: 
1-2). 
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The population of Africa has exceeded the 1 billion mark. Demographic growth is 
considered a crucial element in the shift of power from North to East and South, and the 
fast growing middle classes both in emerging countries, such as BRICS, and in Africa seem 
to account for a significant part of global demand. Recent analyses indicate that the lower 
middle class in countries of the South represents a huge, fast growing new market, which 
will determine different products and services from those until now supplied to the middle 
classes of wealthy countries.  
These recent developments, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, coincide with a period in 
which the control of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) has weakened, opening up a 
space for the reformulation of policies. African countries are now beginning to talk of 
pushing industrial policies forward. The 2011 African Report of the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), entirely dedicated to industrialization 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, argues that the best way to confront the convergence of the food 
and energy crises and global economic depression is to promote industry. Economic 
diversification and structural transformation, involving a shift from low to high 
productivity activities, are expected to iŶĐƌease AfƌiĐa͛s ƌesistaŶĐe to eǆteƌŶal impacts. 
Industrialization, improved labor productivity in agriculture and developments in the 
service sector are factors that can help meet the challenges of job creation for the millions 
of young African people entering the labor market each year (UNCTAD, 2011: 3-4). In fact, 
industrialization is an integral part of the national development programs of South Africa, 
Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Namibia, Nigeria and Uganda (Altenburg, 2011). 
Some experts believe that the development of agribusiness provides an opportunity for 
improving the standard of living of poor populations. Currently, African agriculture has a 
low rate of capitalization, mechanization and added value. The value of agribusiness 
production in Sub-“ahaƌaŶ AfƌiĐa is fouƌ tiŵes loǁeƌ thaŶ Bƌazil͛s, aŶd the agƌiĐultuƌal 
share of GDP in Africa exceeds that of agribusiness by 10%. As a result, less than 30% of 
agricultural produce is processed in Africa, as compared with 98% in high-income 
countries. African countries generate only $40 USD for processing 1 ton of agricultural 
produce, i.e. 4.5 times less than high-income countries (Korwama, 2011). 
The emphasis placed on agriculture has become not only a solution for the problem of 
hunger, but also an attractive road to development in a period of high food prices, 
potentially inverting the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis. In contrast to meso level policies, some 
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development experts have shown a renewed interest in developing so-called inclusive 
businesses, whose activities are market based but geared towards generating social benefits 
by involving beneficiaries as suppliers and customers. A recent study by the Monitor Group 
identified at least 439 enterprises of this kind in nine countries in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(Monitor Group, 2010: 3-4).  
Even the World Bank has shifted from a pessimistic stance to a generalized euphoria 
over the future of the continent:  
Sub-“ahaƌaŶ AfƌiĐa […] iŶ ϮϬϭϭ has aŶ uŶpƌeĐedeŶted oppoƌtuŶitǇ foƌ tƌaŶsfoƌŵatioŶ and 
sustaiŶed gƌoǁth. […] PuttiŶg these faĐtoƌs togetheƌ, the BaŶk ĐoŶĐludes that AfƌiĐa Đould ďe 
on the brink of an economic take-off, much like China was 30 years ago, and India 20 years 
ago. (The World Bank, 2011: 3-4) 
 
The Impact of the Financial Crisis on the Washington Consensus  
The reconfiguration of economic geography started exerting pressure on the old and 
inadequate governance structures of the IMF and World Bank established after the Second 
World War. As a result, they began a slow process of reform that included the 
redistribution of voting shares. First, the voting share of Sub-Saharan Africa rose by 3%, 
but continues to represent only 1.4% of the total. After a second round of revisions, 
ChiŶa͛s ĐalĐulated Ƌuota shaƌe ƌose fƌoŵ 6,38 to 7.47%, which placed it ahead of Japan 
(whose calculated quota declined to 6,99%), but still behind the United States, with 17.8%. 
The total share of the European Union is estimated to fall from 25% in 2000 to 18% in 
2015. Similarly, as a result of the reform of the World Bank governance, only 3.3% of votes 
have been transferred from OECD to developing countries. ChiŶa͛s shaƌe ƌose fƌoŵ Ϯ.ϳϳ to 
4.42%, thus turning it into the third largest shareholder after the US and Japan. However, 
the US continues to be the leading player, holding 16,85% of voting shares, while more 
than one-third of African countries saw their shares actually decrease.  
The financial downturn signaled the need for more radical transformations within the 
IMF. IŶ eaƌlǇ ϮϬϭϭ, the IMF͛s leadeƌship suggested that “D‘s ;IMF͛s “peĐial DƌaǁiŶg ‘ights 
currently composed of the dollar, pound, euro and yen) could help stabilize the global 
financial system. For this to happen, their current role as a reserve currency with the 
FuŶd͛s loaŶs deŶoŵiŶated iŶ “D‘s ǁould Ŷeed to ďe suďstaŶtiallǇ eǆpaŶded to aƌeas suĐh 
as ͞a poteŶtial Ŷeǁ Đlass of reserve assets: tradable SDR denominated securities issued by 
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the FuŶd,͟ oƌ ͞a unit of account which could be used to price internationally traded assets 
;e.g., soǀeƌeigŶ ďoŶdsͿ oƌ goods ;e.g., ĐoŵŵoditiesͿ.͟ These suggestions were presented 
and analyzed in a report published by the IMF in January 2011, which argues that ͞In order 
to make a difference in any of these areas, the role played by the SDR would need to be 
enhanced considerably from its current insignificant level. Very significant practical, 
political, and legal hurdles would need to ďe oǀeƌĐoŵe iŶ the pƌoĐess͟ ;IMF, ϮϬϭϭ: ϭͿ. 
Moreover, it was argued that the inclusion of currencies of emerging economies in the 
current SDR basket would help promote such objectives as increasing the supply of safe 
global assets and ͞reducing negative impacts of exchange rate volatility among major 
ĐuƌƌeŶĐies͟ (ibidem). Such proposals obviously come close, if anything else, to developing 
an alternative to the US dollar as the global reserve currency.  
The proposals for an alternative reserve currency also reflect the growing influence of 
emerging economies, whose central banks, particularly in China, are diversifying their 
foreign currency basket and moving away from the US dollar, which devalued significantly 
against stronger currencies in the first half of 2011. It should be noted, however, that 
emerging countries have a high percentage of their reserves in US treasury bonds, and thus 
want a stronger dollar (Addison, 2011). 
The major world creditors are now countries of the South, many of which achieved 
success through policies that challenged the orthodoxy of the Washington Consensus. The 
IMF͛s Chief EĐoŶoŵist, Oliǀieƌ BlaŶĐhaƌd, ƌeĐogŶized that ͞iŶ the age-old discussion of the 
relative roles of markets and the state, the pendulum has swung — at least a bit — toward 
the state,͟ and that ͞distoƌtioŶs ǁithin finance are macro-relevant͟ ;BlaŶĐhaƌd, ϮϬϭϭ). This 
implies a humble stance but not necessarily a fundamental change.  
IŶdeed, the IMF͛s ƌeĐeŶt staŶĐe oŶ the EuƌopeaŶ deďt Đƌisis ǁas at tiŵes suƌpƌisiŶg foƌ 
those used to the old style Washington Consensus. In Ireland, the IMF first appeared as 
defending the interests of the Irish taxpayers in the face of the European Central Bank and 
IƌelaŶd͛s Đƌeditoƌs ďǇ puttiŶg foƌǁaƌd a plaŶ to ƌeduĐe ͞€ϯϬ ďillion of unguaranteed bonds 
by two-thirds oŶ aǀeƌage͟ (Whitney, 2011). It later changed to a more traditional role as 
the Euro area crisis deepened and creditors began to exert pressure. In any case, the 
macroeconomic policies promoted by some Southeast Asian countries as well as Latin 
AŵeƌiĐa͛s fiscal conservatism coupled with aggressive social policies (through income 
transfer programs) have placed the Washington Consensus on the defensive.  
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The Post-Washington Consensus Era: New Hope for Economists? 
While neoclassical theories are undergoing close scrutiny, economists need to remember 
how Keynes challenged the perfection of markets, particularly financial markets, making 
the case for regulation.  
The return of the State onto the scene to correct market failures is inevitable. Ha-Joon 
ChaŶg ƌeŵaƌks that ͞iŶdustƌial poliĐǇ is ĐoŶspiĐuous ďǇ its aďseŶĐe,͟ ƌeŵiŶdiŶg us of the 
export-oƌieŶted iŶdustƌial poliĐǇ eǆpeƌieŶĐe of “outh Koƌea: ͞sustainable export success 
over a long period of time, for which the country is justly famous, requires protection and 
ŶuƌtuƌiŶg of ͚iŶfaŶt iŶdustƌies͛ thƌough seleĐtiǀe iŶdustƌial poliĐǇ, ƌatheƌ thaŶ fƌee tƌade 
aŶd deƌegulatioŶ.͟ IŶ ĐoŶtƌast to the ͞oŶe size fits all͟ appƌoaĐh pƌoŵoted ďǇ the 
Washington-ďased iŶstitutioŶs, KoƌeaŶs speak of a ͞dǇŶaŵiĐ iPhoŶe ŵodel͟ oƌ ͞a set of 
development apps for every occasion, drawn from successful approaches in different 
ĐouŶtƌies͟ ;ChaŶg, ϮϬϭϬ: ϮϳͿ.  
DaŶi ‘odƌik ;ϮϬϬϴͿ poiŶts to a ͞broader intellectual shift within the development 
profession, a shift that encompasses not just growth strategies but also health, education, 
aŶd otheƌ soĐial poliĐies.͟ He contrasts a traditional policy framework, which is 
͞pƌesuŵptiǀe,͟ staƌts ǁith ͞stƌoŶg pƌeĐoŶĐeptioŶs,͟ pƌoduĐes ƌeĐoŵŵeŶdatioŶs iŶ the 
foƌŵ of a ͞lauŶdƌǇ list͟ of ƌefoƌŵs, aŶd is ͞ďiased toǁaƌd uŶiǀeƌsal ƌeĐipes,͟ ǁith the Ŷeǁ 
policy approach, which emphasizes pragmatism and experimental gradualism. What 
Rodrik ƌeĐoŵŵeŶds is aǀoidiŶg ͞both market fundamentalism and institutional 
fuŶdaŵeŶtalisŵ,͟ aŶd lettiŶg eaĐh ĐouŶtƌǇ ͞devise its oǁŶ ŵiǆ of ƌeŵedies.͟  
In a speech delivered in 2005 at a U.S. Federal Reserve event, Indian economist 
Raghuram ‘ajaŶ, theŶ the IMF͛s Chief EĐoŶoŵist, ǁaƌŶed aďout the real possibility of a 
financial collapse as a result of taking risks that, most of the time, offer generous 
compensation, but involve a low probability of severe negative effects. However, the 
crucial issue was whether banks would be able to provide liquidity to financial markets. 
Based on fiŶaŶĐial aĐtoƌs͛ ƌatioŶalitǇ, ‘ajaŶ poiŶted to the incentive structure of the 
financial sector that encouraged this kind of risk (2005: 2-3). In his 2010 best seller Fault 
Lines: How Hidden Fractures Still Threaten the World Economy, Rajan describes the world 
heading towards the crisis as a world ŵaƌked ďǇ ͞deep fault liŶes͟ aŶd excessively 
dependent on the indebted US consumer to power global economic growth. Easy low-
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income lending and job creation policies stemmed, in his view, from the enormous 
political pressure exercised by growing inequalities and a weak social safety net.  
Finally, Olivier Blanchard himself acknowledges the relevance of behavioral economics 
and behavioral finance, as well as agency theory, when he discusses the workings and 
incentives of the financial sector (Blanchard, 2011). 
After a long period of Washington Consensus orthodoxy, the blossoming of alternatives 
and the variety of approaches are refreshing, all the more so since many of their 
pƌopoŶeŶts aƌe paƌt of ͞the sǇsteŵ,͟ so to speak. It ŵeaŶs that eǀeŶ the doŵiŶaŶt sĐhools 
of economic thought are ready to start revising their views. Alternative currents, including 
evolutionary, institutional, and neostructuralist economics, have resurfaced. We are living 
in exciting times marked by the demise of the ideology that has guided Western policy-
makers and was imposed on the rest of the world for nearly three decades. In truth, the 
confluence of the rise of the South and the decline of the political and ideological 
supremacy of the West is not accidental. In our current globalized world, the critiques of a 
prevailing ideology in particular – derived from post-colonial theories – may be finally 
expected to emerge from the theoretical isolation of philosophical cultural studies into the 
open field of political economy.  
The unlocking of economic theory and the questioning of disciplinary divisions 
represent a window of opportunity for reinvigorating an integrated and ambitious 
sustainable development agenda. The concept of development should be reconsidered 
through a holistic approach, encapsulating intrinsically linked economic, social and 
environmental dimensions, instead of breaking them up into separate compartments. A 
stronger and more democratic state, supported by efficient governance mechanisms, 
should assume this role. This is particularly important if public policies are to provide 
better social protection.  
Knowledge should become public in order to promote collective and global creation. 
The potential of emerging urban centers could also be used for fostering integrated 
regional development and planning, as well as endogenous participatory decision-making 
processes (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010). 
The first practical steps for the actual replacement of the Washington Consensus should 
focus on recovering the regulatory capacity of the state, aligning national accounting 
systems to value intangibles, including the incorporation of externalities and the 
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introduction of innovative indicators, guaranteeing basic income, rationalizing financial 
systems of intermediation, redesigning tax systems, adopting budgets that aim at 
improving the redistribution of resources according to economic, social and environmental 
results, and taxing and registering speculative transactions (Lopes, Sachs & Dowbor, 2010). 
A brave new world is unfolding before us.  
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